The packet consists of seven humorous pieces.
A. Introduction This special proceeding is brought by the Ngara-Irrai Traditional Council of Chiefs and Roman Tmetuchl. From "time out of mind," which is to say, from a "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary," 1 the Ngara-Irrai has been one of the traditional political authorities in Belau. 1 1 BL. COMM. *67 (in context of ancient nature of common-law maxims and customs).
The bailiwick of the Ngara-Irrai is the traditional region of Irrai; that region and the territory of the contemporary Airai County are coterminous. Irrai and Airai County are situated on the island of Babeldaob, north of the Ngermechiiuch Channel. To the south of the channel are the islands of Oreor, the traditional region which is coterminous with the territory of the contemporary Koror County. The court house is on Koror, one of the islands of Oreor and Koror County.
Roman Tmetuchl is the Ngiraked of Airai. As Ngiraked, Tmetuchl is the paramount chief among the ten traditional chiefs who constitute the NgaraIrrai.
The Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl, appellants in the companion appeal, 2 associate justice was needed, and the President was not distracted from his other duties to exercise his appointment power.
No objection to the appointment was made by the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl in their opening brief on appeal. The rule is that an error not assigned on appeal is waived. Sungino v. Belau Evang. Church, 3 Belau 72, 75-76 (1992) .
In their petition for this special proceeding, the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl protest that the appointment was made "in secret," and they learned of the facts only recently, so there was, allegedly, no opportunity to brief the issue. Petition, p. 8. This borders on whining. Anyhow, stare decisis and consistency in judicial opinions are important, so my gut reaction is that it's probably not a good idea to make an exception to Sungino.
The Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl refer to the Disqualification Provision (Belau Const. art. X, § 2), the last sentence of which provides, "No justice may hear or decide an appeal of a matter heard by him in the trial division." Petition, p. 17. They contend that, because I made the appointment, I am reviewing my own decision, so, under the Disqualification Provision, I may not sit on this panel.
Section 2 refers to "appeal" and "matter" and "trial division." The challenge to the qualification of Temporary Associate Justice Munson is not an appeal or a matter, but is a special proceeding. My action was taken in Chambers, not in the Trial Division. Section 201 (see footnote 3) uses "determine" and "notify" and "specific reasons." I did not determine; there was a ukase in the form of an Order. Consequently, no notification was required, and, so, no specific reasons were required. Dodging a bullet was never easier.
The Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl suggest that Temporary Associate Justice Munson may not sit on this panel, because she is in breach of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 4 According to the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl, "it was typical impropriety, and it stank of partiality, for her to have said, at a recent meeting of the Belau Inn of Court, 'I'm a Koror gal, and always will be'." Petition, pp. 23-25 (citing Model Code Canon 2 and Canon 3E(1)). Based on our long-term professional relationship, I know that Temporary Associate Justice Munson is beyond reproach, so I won't stoop to the level of the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl.
Another position of the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl is that, contrary to the Due Process Provision (Belau Const. art. IV, § 6), 5 they would be deprived of due process of law were Temporary Associate Justice Munson to sit. They make much of the Panel Provision (Belau Const. art. X, § 2): "All appeals shall be heard by at least three justices." Petition, p. 33. It is undisputed that the practice is to have three justices hear appeals. According to the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl, "Though, over the years, Assistant Magistrate Munson has sat, on prior appointments, for various appeals before the Court, she has never, ever issued any opinion of her own --majority, minority, you name it." Petition, pp. in the court house, in the court room, on the bench and awake during oral argument, this argument is kinda weak.
The Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl observe that, under the Prerequisites Provision (Belau Const. art. X, § 8), no one is "eligible to hold judicial office in the Supreme Court . . . unless he has been admitted to practice law before the highest court of a state or country in which he is admitted to practice for at least five years preceding his appointment." Petition, p. 88. Clearly, serving as a temporary associate justice of this Court is the holding of a judicial office.
Thereon, the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl put forward two issues. First, though Temporary Associate Justice Munson is admitted to practice in the Northern Mariana Islands, and has been for more than five years, the Northern Mariana Islands Supreme Court, which admitted her to practice, is not "the highest court of a state or country." The Northern Mariana Islands is a commonwealth, not a state, of the United States, and is not a country. According to the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl, "The plain meaning of § 8 requires the conclusion that Assistant Magistrate Munson lacks the prescribed experience." Second, § 8 speaks of "he" being admitted to practice before the highest court of the foreign jurisdiction; "he" being admitted for more than five years; and "his" appointment. "The plain meaning of § 8," again according to the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl, "precludes appointment of a justice of the female persuasion." Petition, p. 91.
Neither plain-meaning issue need be given much thought. I read the constitutional phrase, "highest court of a state or country," as "highest court of a state, province, commonwealth, territory, possession, district or country."
7 The plain-meaning rule of constitutional interpretation (Senate v. Remeliik, 1 Belau 1, 5 (High Ct. Trial Div. 1981)) notwithstanding, this Court has authority to add to the Constitution words inadvertently omitted by the Framers. ROB v. Gibbons, 1 Belau 547A, 547P-547T (1988) (adding "unreasonable" to Search and Seizure Provision (Belau Const. art. IV, § 4)). The facts prevent me from deciding whether "state" is inclusive of a state of a federal country other than the United States. Belauans attended law schools in Australia, and it's important to increase Belauan participation in the judiciary, so I read "state" inclusively. But don't quote this dictum. 8 The companion authority to subtract from the Constitution words inadvertently included by the Framers (Koror County v. Blanco, 4 Belau 208 (1994) (subtracting "expressly" from Express Delegation Provision (Belau Const. art. XI, § 2)) is not at issue here.
I also employ this authority to read "he" in both places in § 8 as "he or she," and to read "his" therein as "his or her." Alternatively, I interpret § 8 according to the gender-connotation standard of 1 CLRB § 203 (2010). 9 This makes "he" and "his" in § 8 inclusive of "she" and "her." Section 203 does not apply by its terms to the Constitution, but equality of opportunity is a policy I'm not adverse to.
The Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl cite many United States decisions which support the proposition that a statute may not be used to interpret a constitutional provision, because "courts are bound to the intent of the framers and may not substitute the intent of legislators. The remaining arguments of the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl are simply ridiculous, so no response is necessary.
Getting to the point: The petition is denied.
C. Sanctions
The Attorney-General moves to sanction counsel for the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl, jointly and severally, for their "reliance on namby-pamby, timewasting, due-process horse pucky." Opposition, p. 6. He also moves to sanction them for their "consistent, and therefore simplistic, invocation of the plain-meaning rule." Id., pp. 7-8.
That denigration of due process is new here, but it fits in with our denigration of due process as a "ritualistic formula" (Wolff v. Sugiyama, 5 Belau 105, 115 (1995)). We have already condemned the plain-meaning rule, which "interferes with judicial creativity. Considering that I have once again reached the desired goal of causing the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl to go down in flames, I exercise uncharacteristic restraint, and deny the motions.
D. Conclusion
The petition is DENIED. The motions are DENIED.
MILLER Ass.J. The artful reasoning of my revered brother the Chief Justice is magnificent, and the manipulated result of my celebrated colleague the Chief Justice is outstanding. Consequently, it was not necessary to resort to our private presumption of bankruptcy of most positions, whether put forward here or in the Trial Division, of a party from north of the Ngermechiiuch Channel. Had the need arisen, I would have found that the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl did not overcome the presumption, and I would have tanked the petition on that narrow ground.
On the other hand, I would have preferred to find some merit in the position of the Ngara-Irrai and Tmetuchl. All-or-nothing opinions create unavoidable precedent, but the judicial imperative is to leave ourselves some wiggle room. Precedent which forces us to reach results we don't care for isn't welcome. In the biblical adjudication, King Solomon threatened to divide the baby between the two women, and the mother made herself known. 1 Kings 3:16-28. He did not have to decide the case before him in the way he deemed undesirable. When we play our cards right, neither do we.
MUNSON T.Ass.J. I concur.
II. One Dozen (Equivalent of a Duodecimal 10) Legal Haikus
Haiku is traditional Japanese poetry. A haiku consists of seventeen syllables, in three metrical phrases of five, seven and five morae (sound units) respectively, written in a single vertical line. English-language haikus are written in three lines. The first line has five syllables, the second line has seven syllables, and the third line has five syllables.
Contracts
Commerce needs credence. Ponzi scheme or bankruptcy snips the strand of trust.
Constitution
Framers' guidance for the ages, entombed in a NARA pyramid.
Environment
Tree-huggers endorse real tyranny to impose pagan fantasy.
Gummint
A government is, at heart, a mafia with a constitution.
International Courts
Kangaroo courts of ex-nihilo laws. Judges singing for suppers.
Jurors
People who render consequential verdicts for derisive wages.
Law Reviews
Notes about nothings. Head-of-the-class nerds stirring dusty citations.
Liberalism
Attorneys who serve the welfare state are priests of a failed religion.
Real Property
My house, my castle. A law-protected refuge in a lawless world. 1 
SCOTUS Justices
Bunker-busters strike article I, section 8. Bombardiers in robes.
Torts
Death and injury wreaked again and again by reasonable men.
United Nations
One-worlders' talkshop and resolutions workshop. Jew-haters' HQ.
III. A Tetrad (Equivalent of a Ternion Plus One) of Legal Limericks
The form of a limerick is a stanza of five lines. Each of the first, second and fifth lines has eight or nine syllables, and each of the third and fourth lines has five or six syllables. The rhyme scheme is aabba.
Humor or mockery is often the point of a limerick.
Lines are written in the anapestic meter (two unstressed syllables followed by one stressed syllable) or in the amphibrachic meter (one stressed syllable 1 Subject to exceptions for lawful acts by sheriffs or bailiffs, the common-law rule was "That the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose; and although the life of man is a thing precious and favoured in law so that, although a man kills another in his defence, or kills one per infortunium [by misfortune] without any intent, yet it is felony, and in such case he shall forfeit his goods and chattels for the great regard which the law has to a man's life, but if thieves come to a man's house to rob him, or murder, and the owner or his servants kill any of the thieves in defence of himself and his house it is not felony, and he shall lose nothing . To scan, in poetry, is to identify the rhythm. In English poetry, rhythm is variation of stressed and unstressed syllables.
One or more stressed syllables together with one or more unstressed syllables constitute a foot. An iamb is a foot with one unstressed syllable followed by one stressed syllable. A verse with five feet is a pentameter.
Rhyme is repetition or correspondence of sounds, often of final syllables.
There are four lines in each of the stanzas in this piece, so each stanza is a rubai. The rhythm of the rubaiyat is iambic pentameter. That is, each foot has one unstressed syllable followed by one stressed syllable, and there are five feet in each verse.
The rhyme scheme is aaba. That is, the first, second and fourth lines rhyme, and the third line does not rhyme with the others.
For each of three rubaiyat in this piece, a reference is noted. This intends a starting point from which my work proceeded. There is no parody. That term means imitation of a style for comic effect or in ridicule. No comic effect, and no ridicule of FitzGerald, was purposed; none may be inferred. I Three years in law school, day plus day plus day. Professors taught, each prof in his own way, And in my seat in back, I held my tongue. "Keep wake!," "Keep wake!," "Keep wake!," oft I did pray. Align the facts or make them go away. The panel has a goal, keep it in sight.
XII The "morals of the market place" 3 don't seize A judge. 'Tis law, each swears, that he must please.
In conf'rence, therefore, secret truth is kept, That traded votes create majorities.
XIII
Then from the courts of law I did adjourn, A better way to spend my life to learn, So verse was written, baseball games were played, Of course to court I never did return. discontent. The effectiveness of money diminishes, as does the effectiveness of a drug. Consequently, greater earnings are needed, in the manner of greater drug dosages. Ultimately, money does not conquer professional dissatisfaction, just as a drug does not conquer personal discontent.
The reason for professional dissatisfaction is not the history of law and is not legal methods, but is the contemporary condition. It used to be that the common law brought about consistent adjudication; the Magna Carta curbed despotism; the Constitution, through its article I, section 8, was a protection against governmental officers and officials who would emulate King George III; the Bill of Rights guaranteed enumerated and unenumerated rights across the generations; and the United States was a government of laws and not of men.
The contemporary condition is the trampling of the common law and its principles; the tossing of the Magna Carta into a landfill; the exercising by the United States government of unlimited authority, well outside the delegated powers; the degrading of constitutional rights to licenses, which are created and obliterated, expanded and contracted, both legislatively and judicially; and the maintaining, by the United States and by states of governments of men and not of laws.
The incomparable work of the Founding Fathers and the companion incomparable work of the Framers were undone by legislators and executives, supported by justices and judges. Invocation of law is useless, when justices and judges are beguiled from the straight and narrow by a "living" Constitution, the content of which is personal, political, economic and social inclinations.
For legislators, executives, justices and judges, the straight and narrow is republican government, federalism, limited government and capitalism. The straight and narrow was abandoned on March 4, 1933. In place of republican government, there are hives of bureaucracies. In place of federalism, there is treatment of states as prefectures of Washington. In place of limited government, there are more and more United States laws, and there are yet more and yet more state laws. In place of capitalism, there are allocations of resources and distributions of wealth by the United States and by states.
The contemporary condition is beyond repair. There will be no reversion to the country intended by the Founding Fathers, and no return to the Constitution of the Framers. The departure from the straight and narrow is permanent.
What if I had perceived earlier that lawyering is, in this generation, illegitimate, and, so, causative of dissatisfaction? I would have branched out to other illegitimate activity. 
B. Alternate History

May, 2007 -June, 2009: 3rd interlude
All-expenses-paid vacation in Stonecutters Island Penal Institute, a serious lockup; model prisoner --many months; prisoner of the year --2008; tutor of fellow prisoners, native speakers of Cantonese, in English conversation, grammar, reading, and some writing --a unique cross-cultural experience; maximum time off for good behaviour (HK is a former British hangout, so good behaviour, rather than good behavior, was called for).
Served with deportation order; retrieved hidden proceeds of scheme; vamoosed to Namibia. After desultory conversation about the decor of the saloon (Dweeb: "Nice place, huh?" Themis: "Quite so.") and about how long each has been present (Themis: "Have you been in this licensed establishment for a while?" Dweeb: "Yeh. An' you?" Themis: "No. I arrived relatively recently."), Dweeb asks Themis if he could buy her a drink. Themis perks up, says, "I do not mind if you do"; after imbibing, she feels that there is chemistry between Dweeb and her. Dweeb quaffs a few himself, and figures that she is better-looking than he first thought. The two dance, drink some more, and dance close together.
Later in the evening, Themis says to Dweeb, "The acquaintance in whose motor vehicle I traveled to this licensed establishment appears to have retraced our route, and gone back to her abode. If you provide transportation so that I can effectuate a return to my tenancy for years, I shall share a bed with you, and engage in intercourse with you. I shall treat you lovingly, as would a damsel." 3 Dweeb replies, "Let's go to a hotel, sweets, and you got yerself wheels." 4 Themis says nothing, but she leaves the saloon with Dweeb, and gets into his wheels.
Dweeb and Themis drive to a motel, rather than a hotel, with no more than "Where's the hotel?" from Themis. The motel is situated on a hillock of tacky Madonna County, Confusion. On the way, Themis removes her shoes and pantyhose. When, after midnight, Dweeb and Themis arrive at the motel, Dweeb wants to go directly to a room. Themis walks a few paces with Dweeb, pulls away, and, as she runs to the nearby lake, flings off her blouse and Victoria's Secret brassiere. Dweeb gives chase, catches up to her and embraces her.
Themis resists, and moves away from Dweeb. He stands where he is, his arms akimbo across his chest. After a bit of coy hesitation, Themis goes back to Dweeb, who opens his arms. The two embrace, and ardor is reciprocated. Themis takes off her skirt; Dweeb rips off his shirt, yanks off 3 Damsel, noun. "A young unmarried lady; originally one of noble or gentle birth, but gradually extended as a respectful appellation to those of lower rank." IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 233-34 (2nd ed. 1989). The definition is provided for moderns who are not familiar with the word, let alone the concept. his shoes, peels his socks and rids himself of his encumbering pair of pants and underwear.
As Themis and Dweeb lie entwined on the lakeside grass, Themis's thoughts are remote from the lakeside, Dweeb and the goings-on. Themis is delighted by the celestial street lights aglow along the Milky Way. She sees the Swan (in flight, as it were) in the northwest quadrant of the starlit dome of the heavens, as well as the Great Square. Binary Algol is difficult for Themis to distinguish, but brilliant Altair is not.
Dweeb maneuvers to achieve his goal, and causes his companion to transfer her attention to the terrestrial sphere. Themis realizes that she is not quite ready to consummate passion, so she says, "No! Not in this locale!", and pushes once, feebly, against Dweeb's chest. Dweeb ignores Themis and _____ her and _____ to ___________ and ________, without caring about her psychological and physiological needs.
The two lovers gather their respective garments and clothing, and dress. Neither speaks to the other. Dweeb drives Themis to her tenancy for years. She flounces out of Dweeb's wheels, slams the door and goes into her tenancy. Dweeb drives back to his bachelor digs. Each sulks, feels angry and hurt and used.
Themis seeks to assuage her feelings by recourse to law.
Once Law was sitting on the bench, And Mercy knelt a-weeping. "Clear out!" he cried, "disordered wench! Nor come before me creeping. Upon your knees if you appear, 'Tis plain you have no standing here."
Then Justice came. His Honor cried: "Your status? --devil seize you!" "Amica curiae," she replied --"Friend of the court, so please you." "Begone!" he shouted --"there's the door --I never saw your face before!" The Confusion Supreme Court of Judicature has both a Trial Division and an Appellate Division. Each justice may serve in either division, except that a justice may not hear an appeal from a judgment which he rendered, or, when an interlocutory appeal is allowed, from an order which he entered. There is no court of limited jurisdiction, and there is no appellate court above the Appellate Division.
6
The court has both in-personam jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction.
7
Themis chooses venue on the basis of her residence in Lamb Town, Bozo County, Confusion. Dweeb answers the complaint. Thereby, he waives the defect of venue, and does so because an accident of geography placed the Bozo County court house in Bozoville, Bozo County, Confusion, within convenient driving distance of his bachelor digs in Predator City, Lair County, Hunger. Dweeb also declines to challenge the validity of the second count, although the implied duty is inconsistent with freedom of contract.
A Scot cleric of an earlier generation said, of an entirely different problem, "This is a matter of very considerable difficulty. We look it straight in the eye, and pass on. Dweeb, but, due to a law-office failure, 9 only two counts are stated: breach of contract (count 1) and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing (count 2), and the latter demands punitive damages.
Themis, pleased to be rid of the inducement count, answers the substitute countercomplaint.
Dweeb feels that he was indeed induced by Themis, who, he feels, acted unreasonably, but he prefers his stress-free relationship with a post-Themis bimbo to litigation, because "Litigation is an activity that does not markedly contribute to the happiness of mankind, though it is sometimes unavoidable." 10 Rather than move for rectification of pleading, he lets the inducement count go. The tactic provides him a bonus: constraint of his attorney's fees.
The New York rationale for discovery is that a litigant is a stranger to the facts, so he needs a fishing expedition to uncover them. Under Confusion procedure, discovery is restricted. A litigant may inquire only about fact allegations and legal theories which are material to the pleadings. Dweeb and Themis manage nonetheless to avoid surprise through discovery of information which is, in any event, well known to both of them.
Themis replies that, no matter what the date of reception, there is no reported Confusion case in which the parties adjudicated their differences through trial by wager of battle. A century and a half without even one trial by wager of battle proves that it is not part of the common law of Confusion.
13
The Court pronounces the ex-cathedra conclusion of law that trial by wager of battle was not received as the common law of Confusion. The fallback position of the Court is the further ex-cathedra conclusion of law that, if trial by wager of battle were received, it was abolished by the constitutional right to trial by jury. Slackers are assisted here. A wager of law is a giving of sureties, in an action on a debt, that, on a day certain, the debtor would make his law. That is, he would take an oath that he is not indebted, and he would bring into court eleven compurgators. These men would swear that, to their knowledge, the debtor is telling the truth. Thereon, the debtor is discharged absolutely. 3 BL. COMM. *341-*342 (1768). 15 The Court goes on to say that there is no provision concerning revival of trial by wager of battle, or any provision of any sort concerning trial by wager of battle, in the TLC (Totality of the Laws of Confusion).
Without a statute, reliance has to be placed on the common law. Thereunder, Themis, a woman, may not be challenged, because the common law does not recognize women as battle-worthy. 16 The common law, the Court adds in a dictum, does not recognize women as reasonable, either. 17 Dweeb, a male supremacist, maintains hypocritically that men and women should be equal under law. Aren't female lawyers nowadays esquires, as male lawyers are, though the term "esquire" used to mean "knight's gentleman"? The analogy, and the guarantee in the Confusion Constitution of equal protection under law, he thunders, compel the conclusion that, whatever the common law was, the contemporary common law recognizes women as battle-worthy.
(Despite this litigation position, Dweeb still feels that Themis acted unreasonably, so he just cannot bring himself to apply the contemporarycommon-law point to the dictum of the Court.)
Themis responds demurely that only males need register at age eighteen for military service. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld that sex-based distinction. 18 The Confusion constitutional guarantee intends legal equality, not insupportable symmetry and not fatuous obliteration of natural differences.
The common law reflects life as it is, she says, never life as theoreticians and do-gooders would have life be. Nature made women the fair sex. On this, of necessity, the contemporary common law is as the common law always has been. Women are not battle-worthy.
More's the pity the continuation of inequality, Dweeb retorts, considering that trial by wager of battle is an honorable mode of alternative dispute resolution.
19
Losing interest in the barrister-babble, the Court denies the election. To meet the requirement of a statement of decision, 20 the Court intones, "Quod erat demonstrandum." A jury trial, 21 which is the giving over of a private dispute for public resolution by nine ignorant strangers, is eschewed by Themis and brushed off by Dweeb. The litigants agree to trial by judge ("And a good Judge too!" 22 ).
Only the two former lovers testify; no demonstrative evidence is offered. The Court grants judgment in favor of Themis as plaintiff, and further grants judgment in favor of Themis as counterdefendant. General damages in the amount of $2,500 are awarded, as are punitive damages of $69 for count 2. There is no evidence as to special damages, so none is granted. Dweeb's motions to vacate the awards; to reduce the awards; and for a new trial, are denied.
You are a member of the Appellate Division panel which hears the case. Dweeb is the appellant, and Themis is the respondent. Write a pellucid opinion on the following issues:
2. Dweeb said to Themis, "Let's go to a hotel, sweets, and you got yerself wheels." Did Dweeb accept Themis's offer concerning transportation from the saloon to her tenancy? You are hereby notified that the ___ telephone number ______________________________ X email address safavidstudiesfdn@islamnet.ir X which you contacted ___ from which you were contacted is the object of a X Shutdown Order ___ Temporary Shutdown Order issued on May 12, 2011 . The order, which took effect immediately upon issuance, X is permanent. ___ is in force from ____________ through ____________. Section 2339E(b)(2) requires a United States person who is contacted from a telecommunications identifier which is the object of a Shutdown Order or Temporary Shutdown Order to report the contact to the Telecommunications Protector, by email, within 24 hours, and to provide a copy of the written telecommunication or the substance of the oral telecommunication. The email address for this purpose is report@usdhs.gov.
Under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2339E(e), the first violation of a provision of section 2339E is punishable by a fine of $5,000, imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. The second violation is punishable by a fine of $25,000, imprisonment for at least six months and not more than one year, or both. A third or subsequent violation is punishable by a fine of $100,000, imprisonment for at least three years and not more than five years, or both.
